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ABSTRACT
Relaxed lending standards, lending without retaining residual risk,
and financial engineering led to a large expansion of mortgage credit
that resulted in the over-origination and over-leveraging of poor
quality mortgage securities products in the years leading up to the
2008 financial crisis. The over-origination of these poor quality
assets has been attributed to a lack of skin-in-the-game by the parties
making lending and structuring decisions in the securitization chain.
The proposed credit risk retention rules, promulgated pursuant to
Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act, attempt to fix the flaws in the
residential mortgage securitization process that led to the financial
crisis by closely aligning the economic interests of parties in the
securitization chain, namely by crafting the Qualified Residential
Mortgage (“QRM”) safe-harbor to risk retention narrowly, and by
prohibiting a securitizer from profiting off of a securitization pool
that ultimately fails by establishing a premium capture cash reserve
account. These proposed rules are currently under attack by a variety
of commentators who seek to expand the definition of the QRM
safe-harbor and ease other restrictions associated with the proposed
rulemaking. This Comment examines the proposed credit risk
retention rules as they apply to residential mortgages and considers
responses to the rules from consumer advocates, politicians, trade
groups, and financiers. In spite of the opposition to the proposed
rules, this Comment urges regulators to maintain most elements of
the proposed rulemaking, including the narrow QRM definition and
restrictions on hedging because they attack certain crucial problems
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that contributed to the recent financial crisis. However, this
Comment proposes a modification of the premium capture cash
reserve account concept in a manner that would better encourage
private label extension of safe credit.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 19, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) filed a complaint alleging fraud against Citigroup for its role in
structuring and marketing a collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) that
derived its value from subprime mortgages.1 Although investors in the
CDO lost hundreds of millions of dollars once the subprime bubble
burst, it was alleged that Citigroup realized net profits of at least $160
million for arranging the CDO.2 Making matters worse, the complaint
alleged that Citigroup selected and marketed $500 million worth of the
assets in the CDO without disclosing to investors that it had entered into
short positions on those assets by purchasing credit default swaps
(“CDS”), thereby placing its economic interests adverse to those of the
investors in the CDO.3 Citigroup entered into a settlement agreement
with the SEC, agreeing to pay a $285 million fine to squash the
complaint, without admitting any wrongdoing.4
Similarly, on April 15, 2010, the SEC filed a complaint alleging
fraud against Goldman Sachs for its role in marketing a CDO to

1. Complaint at 1, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR)).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 2.
4. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2011). The settlement agreement was initially rejected by The Honorable Jed Rakoff,
United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, “primarily
because it included no admission by Citigroup of liability.” SEC v. Citigroup Global
Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 161(2d Cir. 2012) (citing SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc.,
827 F. Supp. 2d at 335). The Second Circuit, however, later granted a preliminary
injunction, staying the proceedings in the District Court pending the outcome of the
appeal on the merits, suggesting that Judge Rakoff erroneously rejected the settlement
agreement. Id. at 168–69. To this date, the appeal of the District Court order is pending
in the Second Circuit.
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investors that derived its value from subprime mortgages.5 Specifically,
the complaint alleged that Goldman failed to disclose that a hedge fund
with economic interests directly adverse to those of investors in the
CDO played a significant role in selecting the assets that collateralized
the CDO.6 Investors in the CDO lost over one billion dollars while the
hedge fund’s CDS exposure to the CDO yielded a profit of
approximately one billion dollars.7 Goldman, which did not retain an
economic interest in the CDO, collected $15 million from the hedge
fund for marketing the CDO to investors.8 Goldman ended up paying a
$550 million fine to the SEC to settle this complaint without admitting
any wrongdoing or liability.9
These two proceedings exemplify the flaws in the originate-todistribute model of mortgage securitization that helped precipitate the
2008 financial crisis (“Financial Crisis”). Because the parties making
lending and structuring decisions in the securitization chain were
exposed to minimal credit risk on the underlying loans and received fees
in proportion to the size of the deals they created, they were incentivized
to cut as many deals as possible, which encouraged shady, and even
predatory, lending and structuring practices.10 This model led to the
over-origination of trillions of dollars worth of poor quality residential
mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) products,11 which, through
financial engineering, infiltrated the balance sheets of many large
financial institutions.12 Once it became apparent that RMBS products
and their derivative offspring, CDOs, were not investment-worthy,
investors dumped these products en masse and financial institutions that
5. Complaint at 1, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 15, 2010).
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id.
9. See Consent Judgment at 1, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010), 2010 WL 2779309.
10. TIMOTHY
F. GEITHNER, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RISK RETENTION REQUIREMENTS 3 (2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/Section%20946%20Risk%20Retent
ion%20Study%20%20(FINAL).pdf; see generally Susan Block-Lieb & Edward Janger,
Demand-Side Gatekeepers in the Market for Home Loans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 465, 465–
70 (2009).
11. KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE AND NEXT STEPS 38 (2011).
12. See, e.g., id. at 53–54.

2013]

DEFENDING SKIN-IN-THE-GAME

409

over-invested in them were unable to borrow against them in the
repurchase agreement (“repo”) markets, which led to the insolvency of
many systemically important financial institutions.13
As the Financial Crisis demonstrates, when incentives are not
aligned, securitization can cause significant harm to the economy.14
Although mortgage related lawsuits have become legion in the wake of
the Financial Crisis,15 the fact that they may be settled for civil penalties
without any admission of liability on the part of financial institutions,16
arguably amounting to a slap-on-the-wrist,17 years after helping to
precipitate a financial crisis (of which the world has yet to recover),
underscores the importance of taking prophylactic measures to reform
the mortgage securitization market.
Requiring that originators or securitizers keep “skin-in-the-game,”
and retain an economic interest in the securitization products packaged
to investors—thereby aligning the interests of investors and
intermediaries—is the focal point of the regulatory reform of
securitization in the wake of the Financial Crisis.18 According to U.S.

13. See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run
on Repo (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,223, 2009), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1454939.
14. See GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 4.
15. See e.g., Consent Order at 4–5, 14–18, United States v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., No. 12 Civ. 1150 (D.D.C. July 12, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/hce/documents/wellsfargosettle.pdf (stipulating that Wells Fargo pay $175
million to settle complaint alleging discriminatory mortgage lending without admitting
any liability or wrongdoing pending court approval); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice,
Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Reaches $335 Million Settlement to Resolve
Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial Corporation (Dec. 21,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-ag-1694.html;
Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Sues Bank of America over “Hustle” Mortgage Fraud,
REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/usbankofamerica-fraud-lawsuit-idUSBRE89N17120121024 (discussing that United States
sues Bank of America alleging that it caused taxpayers more than $1 billion by selling
toxic mortgage assets to Fannie and Freddie in a scheme known as the “Hustle”).
16. See supra notes 4, 9 and accompanying text.
17. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., 824 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333–34 (suggesting
that a $285 million settlement agreement, which, after returning profits collected from
arranging toxic CDOs, amounts to a $95 million civil penalty, is “pocket change” that
will do little to deter a “recidivist” entity as large as Citigroup).
18. Indeed, Representative Barney Frank considers the risk retention provision of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to be the most
important portion of the Act, which totals over 2000 pages. See Nicole Duran, Barney
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Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, “[r]isk retention can help align
the interests of the participants in the securitization chain, reduce the
risks inherent in securitization, and promote the stable formation of
credit and efficient allocation of capital in the United States.”19
Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act20 (“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”) adds a new section 15G to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”)
that generally requires intermediaries in the securitization chain to retain
credit risk of the products they distribute to investors.21 Specifically, the
Act requires securitizers or originators of asset-backed securities
(“ABS”) to retain not less than 5% of any asset unless that asset is a
Qualified Residential Mortgage (“QRM”) or meets other safe harbor
exemptions.22 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”),
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board”), Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“Commission”), Federal Housing Finance Agency
(“FHFA”) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) (the OCC, Board, FDIC, Commission, FHFA, and HUD,
collectively, the “Agencies”) proposed rules to implement the credit risk
retention requirements of Section 15G of the Exchange Act on April 29,
2011 (the “Proposed Rules” or “Proposed Risk Retention Rules”) that
were open for public comment until August 1, 2011.23
The Agencies’ Proposed Rules prohibit a securitizer from profiting
from structuring a RMBS or CDO unless investors in the same are paid
Frank Defends his Law, THE DEAL PIPELINE (July 11, 2011, 5:01 PM),
http://www.thedeal.com/content/real-estate/frank-defends-his-law.php.
19. GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 4.
20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 941, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890–91 (2010).
21. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-11 (West 2012).
22. Id. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i)(I), (II).
23. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011). The
Proposed Rules total 274 pages, and include requests that commentators provide
feedback on174 questions, some of which contain multiple parts. As of this date,
Federal Regulators report that the final QRM rules will not arrive until 2013. Justin T.
Hilley, Fed Regulators Confirm QRM Won’t Arrive in 2012, HOUSING WIRE (June 6,
2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/fed-regulators-confirm-qrm-willarrive-after-2012. The rules will take effect, with respect to residential mortgages, one
year after the final rules are published in the Federal Register and, with respect to all
other classes of asset backed securities, two years after the final rules are published. See
15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-11(i).
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off in full first.24 Additionally, rule makers defined the QRM exemption
to risk retention narrowly to ensure that originators or securitizers retain
an economic interest in most mortgage loans—the policy makers
anticipate that most mortgages would be non-QRM loans.25 Rule
makers believe that this is the best way to encourage safer underwriting
standards, boost investor confidence, and restore the private market for
mortgage securities products.26
The Proposed Rules have been met with opposition from an
unlikely combination of financiers, mortgage brokers and consumer
advocates who believe that the QRM exemption is too narrowly
defined.27 Generally, these commentators fear that the Proposed Rules
ultimately will result in denying home ownership to low and middle
income individuals and minorities.28 Some financial analysts even
suggest that the Proposed Rules may scare sponsors away from the
mortgage-backed securities market altogether, thereby further freezing
the market for private label home loans.29 Other commentators,
however, question whether risk retention does enough to guard against
the dangers of securitization that caused the Financial Crisis.30
Part I of this Comment provides background on problems in the
mortgage securitization chain that caused the Financial Crisis and what
Dodd-Frank Act did to correct these flaws through Section 941. Part II
examines the proposed credit risk retention rules and the definition of
the QRM exemption to risk retention promulgated by the Agencies
pursuant to Dodd-Frank Section 941. Part III analyzes the market
impact of the Proposed Rules and public responses to the proposed rules
from consumer advocates, financiers, and academics. Part IV makes
recommendations ahead of final rulemaking. In particular, Part IV urges
24.
25.
26.

See infra Part II.A.2.
See Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,118.
See, e.g., Press Release, FDIC, Chairman Bair’s Statement on Credit Risk
Retention Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Mar. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/statement03292011.html.
27. See, e.g., Joe Adler, Bankers, Consumer Groups Form Rare Alliance to Urge
Risk
Retention
Easing,
AMERICAN
BANKER
(May
31,
2011),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_104/bankers-consumers-alliance-riskretention-1038197-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., MARK ZANDI & CRISTIAN DERITIS, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, SPECIAL
REPORT: REWORKING RISK RETENTION (2011), available at http://www.economy.com/
mark-zandi/documents/Reworking-Risk-Retention-062011.pdf.
30. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100
GEO L.J. 1177, 1256–58 (2012).
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regulators to keep vital provisions of the Proposed Rules alive, including
the narrow QRM and restrictions on hedging, but suggests a
modification of the rule regarding the premium capture cash reserve
account (“Premium Capture Account”) that would allow a securitizer to
collect fees for arranging a successful securitization transaction more
readily. It is hoped that these recommendations will best achieve the
optimal balance between two goals: on the one hand, keeping
securitization safe by closely aligning the financial incentives of the
parties in the securitization chain and on the other, keeping private
actors interested in arranging securitization transactions at competitive
rates so that credit will be available to borrowers who are actually able
to afford homes.
I. PROBLEMS IN PRE-CRISIS MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION PRACTICE
& THE DODD-FRANK RESPONSE
This Part provides a brief overview of the flaws in the mortgage
securitization process that contributed to the Financial Crisis. This
explanation is not exhaustive but is meant to provide background to help
explain why Congress chose skin-in-the-game as a major component of
mortgage securitization reform. This Part concludes with a discussion of
the new Section 15G of the Exchange Act that Dodd-Frank creates and
the rule making authority it vests upon regulatory agencies to enact skinin-the-game regulations.
A. PRE-CRISIS SECURITIZATION: INTERMEDIARIES WIN, BORROWERS AND
INVESTORS LOSE
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs’
investigation into the Financial Crisis found that flaws in the
securitization process were a major contributor to the crisis.31 Loans
were originated primarily to sell to securitization pools, which meant
that underwriters bore little, if any, of the default risk of the loans they
made to consumers.32 Further, “loan originators, warehouse facilitators,
security designers, credit raters, and marketing and product placement
professionals all received fees for their part in helping to create and

31.
32.

S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128 (2010).
See id. at 43.
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distribute securities.”33 These fees were paid prior to the sale of the
security to investors and increased in proportion to the size of the
securitization.34 Given the capital market demand for such securities,
the originate-to-distribute model created incentives to originate as many
mortgage loans as possible to maximize profits from fee collection.35
Empirical research suggests that the expansion in mortgage credit to
subprime borrowers was caused by an outward shift in the supply of
mortgage credit by lenders (i.e., lax lending standards, abuses of
intermediaries, demand from investors) rather than borrowers
demonstrating greater income potential.36
Fee collection, without residual risk, ultimately drove mortgage
originators to underwrite increasingly risky, and even predatory,
mortgage loans.37 Mortgage originators made suspect loans, such as
“liar” loans—where borrowers’ documentation was not reviewed—and
“ninja” loans—loans made without information on the borrower’s
income, job, or assets.38 Further, mortgage brokers were rewarded with
yield spread premiums and additional fees for steering borrowers
towards costlier subprime loans.39 Originators then sold these loans to
33. Securitization of Assets: Problems and Solutions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.,
and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 70 (2009) (testimony of Dr. William W. Irving,
Portfolio Manager, Fidelity Investments).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion:
Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis, 124 Q. J. ECON. 1449, 1477–83
(2009), available at http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/124/4/1449.full.pdf+html.
37. Increased competition among mortgage originators has been linked to the
erosion of underwriting standards that caused the Financial Crisis. Specifically,
mortgage originators competed with one another for market share, which led to a race
to the bottom in underwriting standards in order to originate as many loans as possible.
See Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1924831 (arguing that mortgage lending was safer when competition was weaker
and securitizers, rather than originators, monitored underwriting standards). Accord
David Line Batty, Dodd-Frank’s Requirement of “Skin In the Game” for Asset-Backed
Securities May Scalp Corporate Loan Liquidity, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 13, 39 (2011)
(suggesting that the incredible demand for securities products encouraged very risky
lending decisions).
38. See Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities
Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1359, 1397 (2009).
39. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 21–32.
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securitizers, who in turn packaged them to investors all over the world,
paying little, if any, attention to the quality of the loans they were
distributing.40
Without being forced to keep skin-in-the-game, securitizers,
looking to satisfy virtually insatiable demand for AAA debt41 and
believing that diversification alone would lessen portfolio risk of such
debt,42 made increasingly complex re-securitization products, such as
CDOs, CDO-squared, and CDO-cubed, which enabled them to pass any
risk they retained in an ABS to investors.43 ABS products are broken up
into tranches, and tranches are paid sequentially from the most senior
tranche to the most subordinate tranche.44 Prior to the Financial Crisis,
more senior tranches would receive the highest rating from ratings
agencies whereas mezzanine or subordinate tranches generally received
below investment-grade ratings.45 In practice, securitizers ended up
retaining a stake in the more subordinated tranches with below
investment-grade ratings because of lack of investor demand for these
“riskier” products.46 This did not incentivize securitizers to monitor
loan quality, however. Instead, to avoid retaining exposure to poorly
rated subordinated tranches, securitizers would re-securitize the below
investment grade tranches into new products, such as CDOs.47 The
CDOs would also pay out sequentially from the most senior to the most
subordinate tranche and receive corresponding credit ratings even
though the assets underlying the CDO may have been from below

40.
41.

See id.
See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 9 (“[E]ssentially, there is not enough
AAA debt in the world to satisfy demand, so the banking system has set out to
manufacture the supply.”).
42. See Mendales, supra note 38, at 1389 (arguing that the CDO bust demonstrated
that thousands of bad asset-backed securities pooled together are as toxic as any of
them individually).
43. See e.g., Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 9–10 (explaining that each level
of securitization brought an additional level of opacity with regard to what exactly was
behind each tranche).
44. See, e.g., Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 471–72.
45. See id.
46. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 10–11. Institutional investors, such as
pension funds or mutual funds, are often only allowed to invest in investment grade
securities or higher (typically A or higher). See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at
471.
47. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 51–52.
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investment grade tranches in the initial ABS.48 This allowed securitizers
to parcel out the risk they retained in the riskiest tranches of an ABS to
investors in the form of investment grade securities.49 If securitizers
were again forced to retain exposure on the more poorly rated CDO
tranches, the process was repeated to make CDO-squares, and, in turn,
repeated again to make CDO-cubes.50
The complexities of re-securitizations made it very difficult for
investors to understand the quality of the assets they were purchasing.51
Without originators or securitizers monitoring loan quality, they were
reliant on credit ratings agencies to reveal the quality of the assets
underlying the securitization products they purchased.52 The ratings
agencies were unable to fulfill this gate-keeping role.53 Ratings
agencies, like the securitizers themselves, had no required exposure to
the products they rated and received fees from securitizers for rating
products.54 Contrary to their better judgment, credit ratings agencies
gave risky ABS and risky re-securitization products that they knew were
prone to high default rates investment grade ratings in order to generate
future business from securitizers.55 Whereas corporate debt rated Baa
(the lowest investment grade rating) defaulted at a rate of 2.2% from
1983 to 2005, CDOs with the same credit rating defaulted at a rate of
24% from 1993 to 2005.56 Such a differential in default rates between
bonds of the same credit rating suggests that the pre-crisis securitization
market could not regulate itself properly when the parties best able to

48.
49.
50.

See id. at 52–53.
See id.
See id. This is not to say that securitizers were per se setting up investors to
fail. They believed that diversification, rather than monitoring the borrower’s ability to
repay, would protect investors from suffering systematic losses. This turned out to be
false when all of the mortgages underlying these products were of poor quality. See
Mendales, supra note 38, at 1389 (arguing that Criimi Mae’s collapse after investing
primarily in junior tranches of CDOs exemplifies that there is a limit to the extent to
which diversification can make securitized products safe).
51. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128 (2010); see also GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY
THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010) (emphasizing how difficult it is to
pierce the veil of a CDO and learn exactly what lies beneath each tranche).
52. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 472–75.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 51–56.
56. See Mendales, supra note 38 at 1396.
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monitor the underwriting quality of securitization products did not keep
skin-in-the-game.57
B. SECURITIZATION’S VOLATILE EFFECTS, OVERLEVERAGING AND
IRRATIONAL ACTORS
The Financial Crisis demonstrated that if securitization is left
unregulated, banks are susceptible to collapse because markets are
unable to fully internalize the risks securitization can pose to financial
and economic activity.58 The Financial Crisis showed us that a localized
real estate bust can threaten the solvency of the banking system due in
part to financial interdependence and irrational actors.59 Some financial
economists argue that although the creation of safe securities is
desirable, securitization and other financial engineering (dubbed in
academic literature as “financial innovation”) expose the financial
system to crisis.60 A recent model of the Financial Crisis suggests that

57. Accord Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 472-73 (arguing that the RMBS
market collapsed because the mortgage lending model shifted from an investment
model to a sales model and credit rating agencies failed to value mortgage pools
properly).
58. See GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 14 (“Taken as a whole, these problems
illustrate that markets are unable, in certain circumstances, to align the incentives of
parties in the securitization chain adequately. Moreover markets may not fully
internalize the risks securitization can pose to financial and economic stability. Such
weaknesses demonstrate the need for regulatory reforms.”).
59. See, e.g., Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 478-79 (discussing the
cognitive limitations of consumer borrowers to make sound borrowing decisions as it
relates to purchasing a home); Nicola Gennaioli et al., Neglected Risks, Financial
Innovation, and Financial Fragility 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No.16068, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16068 (explaining
that sophisticated institutions also may irrationally over-invest in a securities product).
I do not endeavor to provide the full behavioral finance explanation in this space but a
cursory discussion of a few root causes is warranted to put securitization reform into
perspective.
60. See, e.g., Gennaioli et al., supra note 59, at 39; Josh Lerner & Peter Tufano,
The Consequences of Financial Innovation: A Counterfactual Research Agenda 5–10
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16780, 2011), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16780.pdf (explaining the pros and cons of financial
innovation); Jeremy Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial-Stability Regulation, (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16883, 2011), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16883 (“This paper . . . defines the fundamental market
failure to be addressed, namely that unregulated private money creation can lead to an
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the creation of new and complex securities products (such as CDOs and
CDSs) to satisfy investor demand creates a boom and bust tendency
because investors, even sophisticated ones like financial institutions, are
irrational,61 tending to be initially overly optimistic about the investment
prospects of new securities products.62 This over-optimism manifests
itself in both excessive origination of the underlying asset,63 as well as
excessive willingness of financial institutions to borrow and lend against
the securitized assets on a short-term basis.64 Once certain “neglected
risks” of these products are realized, the market’s view towards them
turns sharply: investors seek to dump these products, new issuance stops
and the willingness to lend against these securities products as collateral
(i.e., repo financing) deteriorates.65
This behavioral model of over-optimism followed by sharp
pessimism helps to explain how subprime mortgage securitization
precipitated the Financial Crisis. When subprime lending was at its
peak, it “helped accelerate price increases in the housing market to
unsustainable levels and, therefore, contributed to the ensuing decline in
housing prices and the economy.”66 A problematic feedback loop
developed where increases in home prices encouraged greater lending
and increases in lending precipitated further increases in home prices.67
Increases in housing prices led to further investment in mortgage
securities products and large financial institutions started to increasingly
use these products to collateralize short-term borrowings (i.e., as
collateral for repo agreements).68 Trillions of dollars worth of subprime
externality in which intermediaries issue too much short-term debt and leave the system
excessively vulnerable to costly financial crises”).
61. The use of the term irrational investor in this context is meant as short-hand for
the theory of “local thinking,” which describes a scenario where an investor makes
investment decisions based on a subset of possible outcomes rather than taking into
account all of the information the market has to offer, as the efficient market hypothesis
assumes. See Gennaioli et al., supra note 59, at 5.
62. See id; see generally Lerner & Tufano, supra note 60.
63. This over-origination is the product of both irrational investment decisions on
the part of consumers and the failures of “demand-side gate keepers” to monitor loan
quality. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 10, at 475–83.
64. Gennaioli et al., supra note 59, at 2–3.
65. Id. at 3.
66. See GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 12 (citing Mian & Sufi, supra note 36, at
1477–83).
67. See id.
68. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 13, at 1–2, 10–11. Prior to the crisis,
investment banks, especially Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and
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securities products were created.69 Later, when home prices began to
decline and subprime mortgages began to default, investors sought to
dump mortgage securities products en masse and the value of these
securities products plummeted.70 For banks that over-invested in these
products or over-leveraged them, a “bank-run” ensued, whereby
investors refused to finance banks’ short term debt by purchasing repo
agreements,71 including repos that were collateralized by safer securities,
such as commercial paper.72 The inability of financial institutions to
finance their short-term debt through the repo market was a death
sentence for Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers,73 and necessitated a
government bailout for other Wall Street players through TARP.
Further, demand for all securities products screeched to a halt,
constricting the general flow of credit available to consumer
borrowers.74
Left unregulated, securitization can be incredibly volatile. Although
subprime defaults were fairly localized in the United States, the local

Bear Sterns, and even commercial banks, such as Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, and Bank of
America, relied heavily on the “repo” market for their short-term liquidity needs. A
repo agreement is a two-part transaction that is primarily between a bank and an
institutional investor. In the first step, a bank or borrower transfers securities, in
exchange for cash, to a depositor or lender.
The second step includes a
contemporaneous agreement by the bank to repurchase the securities at a premium on a
specified future date. The repo market collateralizes banks’ short-term borrowing with
securities products and acts as a safe, deposit-like investment, for institutional investors
or other entities. See id. at 10.
69. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 38 and accompanying text.
70. See Gennaioli et al., supra note 59, at 2–3, 38.
71. See id. at 37–38.
72. See id.; see also Daniel M. Covitz, Nellie Liang, & Gustavo A. Suarez, The
Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market,
(Divs. of Res. & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No.
2009-36, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/
200936pap.pdf (arguing that panic over the solvency of banking institutions led to
contraction of demand for asset backed commercial paper securities, severely crippling
banks’ ability to finance short-term debt).
73. See, e.g., Gorton & Metric, supra note 13, at 1–2, 4, 10–11.
74. See GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 13 (noting that during the financial crisis the
prices of other ABS, such as those backed by auto loans, credit cards, student loans,
loans to businesses, and loans secured by heavy equipment, all fell dramatically and
simultaneously).
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default crises were parceled to investors all over the world. 75 At the
time the government took over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had
taken a severe beating by guaranteeing subprime loans, the two
government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) held half of the United
States’ $12 trillion residential mortgages.76 Moreover, investors all over
the globe, including foreign governments, held over $ 5.4 trillion in debt
securities backed by the GSEs.77 Clearly, securitization had serious
global macroeconomic consequences.
C. THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE
Financiers, mortgage brokers, irrational actors and the inherent
volatility of securitization in well-integrated markets are not the only
causes of the Financial Crisis. The government’s desire to push for the
American (Pipe) Dream of homeownership also fueled the Financial
Crisis.78 The HUD affordable housing initiative under the Federal
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act79 incentivized
both government sponsored institutions, namely Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, and private lending institutions to increase home
ownership.80 The easiest way of reaching HUD’s goals, especially
among distressed communities, was to relax lending standards.81 As a
result, the use of “innovative lending standards to allow for the
acceptances of loans of more than 97% [loan to value ratio (“LTV”)], of
loans to those with impaired credit, high debt [to income] ratios, and
questionable income potential” became more prevalent.82 The Bush
Administration went so far as to embrace subprime loans as the key to
growth in homeownership, especially for minority Americans.83 The
initial consequence of the government’s desire to increase affordable
housing was the lowering of underwriting standards of commercial

75. See Mendales, supra note 38, at 1359; see also Mian & Sufi, supra note 36, at
1 (noting that subprime defaults were concentrated to a handful of zip codes).
76. See Dale A. Oesterle, The Collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Victims
or Villains?, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 733, 733 (2010).
77. See id. at 734.
78. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 20–21; Oesterle, supra note 76,
at 749–52.
79. 12 U.S.C. § 4501 (2006).
80. See Oesterle, supra note 76, at 749–52.
81. Id. at 750.
82. Id.
83. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 21.
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mortgages to meet affordable housing goals.84
However, the
government’s encouragement of lower underwriting standards
eventually extended to all types of home loans.85 Consequently, well-off
borrowers and real estate speculators were able to take out risky high
leveraged loans for second homes, retirement homes and vacation
homes.86 In the end, the originate-to-distribute model of lending,
supported by the government’s desire to increase home ownership,
deteriorated underwriting standards for all home loans, and contributed
to the Financial Crisis.87 The government eventually stepped in and
took over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the private label mortgagebacked securities market has yet to recover. 88
D. WHAT DODD-FRANK DID; SECTION 941
Through Dodd-Frank, Congress added a new Section 15G to the
Exchange Act to correct the flaws in the securitization process discussed
above, namely by reforming the originate to distribute model of
securitization so as to align the economic interests of investors and
intermediaries in the securitization chain. 89 Congress felt that credit risk
retention would encourage securitizers to monitor carefully the loans
they purchase from originators which, in turn, would, at the very least,
create disincentives to risky and predatory lending.90 In addition, the
84.
85.

See Oesterele, supra note 76, at 749–52.
“Had the banks and Fannie and Freddie limited the loosening of their
underwriting standards to CRA loans, the mortgage crisis would not have been a crisis.
However the lowered underwriting standards infected all underwriting standards.” Id.
at 751 (citing Edward Pinto, How Did Paul Krugman Get it So Wrong? (Nov. 9, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22327819/PintoHow-Did-Paul-Krugman-Get-It-So-Wrong-11-9-09. See also Brent J. Horton, In
Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REV. 827, 881–82
(2009) (arguing that congressional initiatives to expand home ownership are at fault for
precipitating the Financial Crisis).
86. See id.
87. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11, at 21.
88. Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26, at 3 (“[T]he private securitization market,
which created more than $1 trillion in mortgage credit annually in its peak years of
2005 and 2006, has virtually ceased to exist in the wake of the crisis. Issuance in 2009
and 2010 was just 5% of peak levels.”).
89. Id. at 1 (“Fundamentally, [Section 15G] is about reforming the ‘originate-todistribute’ model for securitization, and realigning the interests in structured finance
towards long-term, sustainable lending.”). See also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 129 (2010).
90. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128.
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limited empirical research available91 suggests that RMBS products are
less likely to suffer losses when the economic interests of the parties in
the securitization chain are aligned.92
As it pertains to residential mortgage securitization, Section 15G
generally requires securitizers93 to retain not less than 5% of any ABS
unless all of the assets that comprise the securitization pool are qualified
residential mortgages (QRMs)—that is, even if every mortgage but one
in a securitization pool is a QRM, a sponsor would be required to retain
at least 5% of an economic interest in the pool.94 In particular, the
legislation specifically prohibits a securitizer or its affiliates from
directly or indirectly hedging against its required exposure to the
products it securitizes, thereby keeping the interests between investor
and intermediary closely aligned.95 The legislation specifically requires
regulators to specify permissible forms of risk retention,96 define the
91.
92.

See GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 17.
See Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, How Important is Having Skin in
the Game? Originator-Sponsor Affiliation and Losses on Mortgage-backed Securities,
25 REV. FIN. STUD. 3217 (2012), available at http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/
2012/09/10/rfs.hhs095.full.pdf (showing that default rates on securitized mortgages
were lower when originators and securitizers were affiliated entities because an
originator was less likely to sell poor quality assets to its own affiliate).
93. The legislation defines a “securitizer” as “(A) an issuer of an asset-backed
security; or (B) a person who organizes and initiates an asset-backed securities
transaction by selling or transferring assets, either directly or indirectly, including
through an affiliate to the issuer.” 15 U.S.C.A. 78o-11(a)(3) (West 2012).
94. See id. § 78o-11(c)(1). Section 15G states that the Agencies must permit
securitizers to retain less than 5% of the risk of commercial mortgages, commercial
loans, and auto-loans if those loans meet underwriting standards that indicate that they
are of low credit risk. Id. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(ii), (c)(2)(B). In addition, 15G creates an
exemption for loans to farming entities, loans backed by the federal government, and
loans backed by state governments. Id. § 78o-11(c)(G)(iii). The Agencies’ also have
the authority to issue other exemptions, exceptions or adjustments for other classes of
institutions or assets as appropriate. Id. § 78o-11 (e)(1). Enforcement authority under
the statute (and related regulations) rests with the appropriate Federal banking regulator
(e.g., the Board, OCC, FDIC) if the securitizer is an insured depository institution and
the Securities and Exchange Commission if the securitizer is not an insured depository
institution. Id. § 78o-11 (f).
95. Id. § 78o-11(c)(1)(A).
96. Id. § 78o-11(c)(1)(C)(i). Cognizant of the fact that different forms of risk
retention may be warranted for different asset classes, Dodd-Frank gives the regulatory
agencies flexibility in determining the scope and nature of how securitizers are to retain
credit risk. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 130 (2010). Section 15G authorizes regulators to
craft risk retention rules and exemptions specifically tailored for asset classes other than
residential mortgages, such as commercial mortgages, commercial loans, auto loans and
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QRM, create a total or partial exemption for federally-issued or
guaranteed ABS, create a total or partial exemption for state-issued or
guaranteed ABS, and allow for the allocation of required risk retention
to be split between a securitizer and originator.97 In addition, the
legislation gives regulators leeway to craft other safe harbor exemptions
if appropriate for the protection of investors.98
Although Section 15G delegates defining the QRM to regulators, it
is important to note that the ultimate definition of the QRM may be no
broader than the definition of the Qualified Mortgage (“QM”), as
defined in Title 14 of the Dodd-Frank Act.99 Title 14 of the Act amends
the Truth in Lending Act to empower the Board to set mortgage
originating standards that would generally prohibit a lender from
extending mortgage credit to a borrower unless the borrower
demonstrates the ability to repay the loan.100 Sections 1411 and 1412 of
the Act generally require creditors to make a reasonable determination
of a consumer’s ability to repay a residential mortgage loan as well as
establish certain protections from liability under this requirement for

any other asset class that the Board, OCC, FDIC and the SEC deem appropriate. See §
78o-11(c)(2)(A). Some scholars argue that skin-in-the-game would not necessarily
encourage safer underwriting standards for classes of asset-backed securities other than
residential mortgages. See generally Batty, supra note 37 (arguing that skin-in-thegame would not necessarily make the market for collateralized loan obligations any
safer); Joseph Philip Forte, Risk Retention in CMBS Lending—Reality or Illusion,
SS047 ALI-ABA 1255, 1259 (2011) (arguing that risk retention by a securitizer is
unnecessary in the market for commercial real estate loans because a third party
purchaser of subordinate tranches adequately serves to monitor the loans underlying the
CMBS); Adam J. Levitin, Skin-In-The-Game: Risk Retention Lessons From Credit
Card Securitization (Georgetown University Law Center, Business, Economics and
Regulatory Policy Working Paper Series Research Paper No. 11-18, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1898763 (arguing that risk retention
plays a questionable role at best in incentivizing better underwriting quality in the
market for credit card ABS because the market, in effect, polices itself through implicit
recourse).
97. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-11(c)(1)(G)(ii) (West 2012).
98. See id. § 78o-11 (c)(1)(B)(ii), (c)(2)(B).
99. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1412, 124 Stat. 1376, 2145 (2010).
100. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1639c(a), (b)(1) (West 2012). This section of the Truth in
Lending Act was added pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010).
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home loans that constitute “qualified mortgages.”101 The Qualified
Mortgage (“QM”) is not to be confused with the Qualified Residential
Mortgage, the proposed rules for which are discussed at length in this
Comment. The QM—the final rules of which were recently adopted—is
the exemption that insulates a lender from liability for failing to comply
with the ability to pay provisions under Dodd-Frank and regulations
promulgated there-under by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”).102 In contrast, the QRM is the exemption that allows
sponsors to avoid retaining risk in a securitization transaction where the
underlying assets in the pool are residential mortgages.103 Although full
discussion of the QM rules is beyond the scope of this Comment, at a
minimum, a QM may not provide for (i) negative amortization, (ii) a
balloon payment that is twice the average of earlier payments, (iii) total
points and fees of more than 3% of the loan amount, and (iv) a mortgage
term of more than thirty years.104 Additionally, in the case of an
adjustable rate mortgage, the underwriting for a QM must be based on
the maximum rate for the loan during the first five years and a payment
schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the loan term.105 Because a
QRM may not be defined more broadly than a QM, the QRM must, at a
minimum, meet the above requirements.106 The statutory language
seems to imply that the QRM is supposed to be more narrowly defined
than the QM. It is also interesting to note that the QM (unlike the

101. Id. § 1639c(b)(2); see also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Press
Release, “Ability to Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in
Lending Act” (Regulation Z), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
regulations/ability-to-repay-and-qualified-mortgage-standards-under-the-truth-inlending-act-regulation-z/#doccontents.
102. The final QM rules issued by the CFPB create two separate qualified mortgage
safe harbors based on the credit risk of a mortgage loan. The lenders who make loans
that conform with the safer of the two standards are insulated from liability entirely for
making a good faith determination of a borrower’s ability to repay a loan, whereas
lenders who make loans that conform to the riskier QM are afforded a rebuttable
presumption of compliance with the ability to-repay provisions. See Ability-to-Repay
and Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78
Fed. Reg. 6407, 6586–87 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 1026.43(e)).
103. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-11(c)(1).
104. See id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A). There is an exemption for extending the mortgage
term past thirty years in high cost areas. See § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(vii). Dodd Frank gives
the Board the authority to treat a reverse mortgage as a QM and have the borrower’s
debt-to-income ratio factor into the QM. See § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(vi), (ix).
105. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(v).
106. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A).
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proposed QRM)107 has no requirement of a down payment on the part of
the borrower.108
Table 1: Summary of 15 U.S.C. 78o-11 For
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
Risk retention:
What is set by statute











What is left up to
regulators to decide







107.
108.

Securitizer must retain 5% of the credit risk of an
ABS unless all of the mortgages collateralizing a
securitization pool are QRMs.
Issuer, Sponsor, or Depositor (as applicable) may
not directly or indirectly (i.e., an entity affiliated
with the issuer, sponsor or depositor may not) hedge
against its 5% required interest in an ABS by
purchasing CDS or insurance contracts.
QRM must fit within the definition of the QM as
defined under Title 14 of Dodd-Frank (which
amends the Truth In Lending Act).
No reverse mortgages or interest only payments.
For adjustable rate mortgages, interest rate may not
increase by more than 2% in any twelve-month
period or by 6% over the life of the transaction.
Total or partial exemption for ABS backed by state
or federal government.
The form risk retention takes (i.e., how does a
securitizer retain a 5% stake in an ABS).
The narrowness of the definition of QRM (but no
broader than the definition of QM).
The minimum duration of Risk Retention.
Must establish appropriate standard of risk retention
for re-securitization products.
Scope of exemption for ABS backed by state or
federal government.

See infra Part II.B.6.
Clea Benson, Housing Industry Awaits Down-Payment Rule for Mortgages,
BLOOMBERG, (Jan. 18, 2013, 12:01 AM) (noting that the QM fell short of requiring a
down payment requirement), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0118/housing-industry-awaits-down-payment-rule-for-mortgages.html.
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II. THE PROPOSED RMBS RISK RETENTION RULES AND QRM SAFEHARBOR
On April 21, 2011, the Agencies released proposed rules on credit
risk retention, as required by Section 15G.109 This section provides an
overview of the risk retention rules, highlights a few important rules that
will change economic incentives of sponsors in a securitization
transaction, and breaks down the Agencies’ proposed definition of the
QRM safe-harbor.
A. RISK RETENTION RULES
Though Dodd-Frank gave the Agencies the authority to require a
higher level of risk retention, the Proposed Rules require that a
securitizer retain not less than 5% of an interest in an ABS for its entire
duration unless certain exemptions are met. The details of three
particular parts of the Proposed Rules that apply to the securitization of
all asset classes are fundamental to understanding how the securitization
market will change: (1) how risk is to be retained, (2) the establishment
of a Premium Capture Account, and (3) prohibitions on hedging.

109. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011). In
considering how to determine whether a mortgage is of sufficient credit quality to
constitute a QRM, the Agencies looked at a mortgage performance dataset that
consisted of underwriting and performance information on approximately 8.9 million
mortgages. Id. at 24,117–18. In addition, the Agencies looked to another dataset that
consisted of more than 75 million mortgages that were packaged into ABS. As per the
above-described legislation, the Proposed Rules require that sponsors or originators of
asset backed securities retain a 5% position in the ABS unless the loans underlying the
securitization meet prescribed safe harbors. Importantly, the Proposed Rules do not
allow a sponsor to hedge directly or indirectly its interest in the securitization it
arranges. This would prevent a sponsor’s affiliated entity from purchasing a credit
default swap or other insurance contract that would have the net effect of negating the
risk retained in the securitization of the sponsor. Consistent with the intent of skin-inthe-game regulatory reform, the prohibition on a sponsor hedging its skin (i.e.,
purchasing credit default swaps) ensures that a sponsor’s incentive to monitor loan
quality is not offset by insurance. See id. at 24,117.
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1. How Risk May Be Retained
The Proposed Rules provide a menu of options by which
securitizers may structure their risk retention for a given asset class.110
As it pertains to RMBS transactions, this includes more obvious
methods, such as horizontal retention (holding the lowest tranche in an
ABS in the amount equal to 5% of the entire ABS), vertical retention
(retaining not less than 5% of each tranche in an ABS), L-shaped
retention (a combination of horizontal and vertical: holding 2.5% of
each tranche in an ABS and holding a portion of the lowest tranche in an
ABS equal to 2.564%), and retention by holding a representative sample
(holding a random sample of unsecuritized loans that were picked for
securitization).111 A sponsor using these methods must disclose to
investors how it is retaining credit risk as well as the material
assumptions and methodologies used in determining the aggregate dollar
amount of the ABS interests issued to investors in the securitization
transactions.112 Based on custom and practice in the securitization
industry, the Proposed Rules also include retention structures suited for
particular asset classes, such as revolving lines of credit, asset-backed
commercial paper, and commercial mortgage-backed securities.113
2. Premium Capture Cash Reserve Account
The Proposed Rules require a securitizer to keep any profits
collected for arranging a securitization transaction in a Premium Capture
Account.114 The Premium Capture Account is a trust account that serves
110.
111.

See S. REP. NO. 111-76, at 130 (2010).
See Credit Risk Retention, §§___.3, ___.6, ___.8, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090,
24,158–59 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011).
112. See id. §§ ___.4(b), ___.5(c), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,158–59.
113. See id. §§___.7, ___.9 –___.10, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,159–62. The rule also
allows for risk retention to be split between originator and securitizer, as an additional
means of giving intermediaries flexibility in structuring risk retention. Id. §___.13, 76
Fed. Reg. at 24,163. There are safe harbor exemptions in the Proposed Rules for
commercial mortgages, commercial loans, and auto-loans. See id. §§___.16 – ___.20,
76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167–72. Although rule makers had the authority to adopt safe harbor
exemptions for other classes of ABS, such as revolving lines of credit, no such
exemptions were adopted. See id. §___.7.
114. See id. §___.12(a), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,162. The plain language of the Proposed
Rules does not appear to allow a sponsor to be compensated outside of the premium
capture cash reserve account as the amount by which the gross proceeds received by a
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as a first loss position in an ABS.115 Meaning, before any losses in an
ABS may be realized, funds from the account shall be released to satisfy
payments on ABS interests on any date on which there are insufficient
funds to satisfy an amount due on an ABS.116 Put differently, any profits
a securitizer earns for arranging a securitization transaction are held in
trust to satisfy its payment obligations to investors and may not be
collected by the securitizer unless investors in the ABS are paid in
full.117 Furthermore, the amounts in the trust account may only be
invested in one-year U.S. Treasuries or in one or more depository
institutions that are fully insured by the FDIC.118 The Premium Capture
Account must be established regardless of whether or not an ABS is
exempt from risk retention.
3. Prohibitions on Hedging
The Proposed Rules prohibit securitizers and their affiliates from
directly or indirectly hedging against their required exposure to the
products they securitize, thereby keeping the interests between investor
and intermediary closely aligned, with a few exceptions.119 Securitizers
may still hedge against interest rate risk, and foreign exchange risk.120
Importantly however, securitizers cannot simply bet against a
securitization pool entirely so that their interests are adverse to that of
investors in the ABS, as seen in the years leading up to the Financial
Crisis.121

sponsor, net of costs paid out by the sponsor to unaffiliated parties, exceeds the par
value of all interests in an ABS must be held in the premium capture cash reserve
account. See id.
115. See id. §___.12(b)(1), (3), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,162.
116. See id.
117. See id. §___.12(b)(3), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,162.
118. See id. §___.12(b)(2), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,162.
119. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,116 (“The proposal prohibits a sponsor and its
consolidated affiliates from purchasing or selling a security or other financial
instrument, or entering into an agreement (including an insurance contract) . . . [that] in
any way reduces or limits the financial exposure of the sponsor to the credit risk of one
or more of the particular ABS interests.”). This rule specifically inhibits issuers from
using credit default swaps to limit exposure to any retained interest they may have in an
RMBS.
120. See Credit Risk Retention, §___.14(d)(1), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,163.
121. See id. §___.14, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,163; see also supra notes 1–9 and
accompanying text.

428

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

B. THE QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
For a securitizer to be exempt from retaining risk in an RMBS, all
of the mortgages that collateralize the ABS must be QRMs at the closing
of the securitization transaction and each of the QRMs collateralizing
the ABS must be currently performing—that is, the borrower must not
be more than 30 days past due in whole or in part on the mortgage.122 In
addition, the depositor123 or sponsor124 of the ABS (as applicable) must
certify that it evaluated the effectiveness of its internal supervisory
controls for ensuring that all of the assets that collateralize the ABS are
QRMs (as defined below).125 Finally, the sponsor must provide a copy
of the certification described above to potential investors before the sale
of the ABS and, upon request, to the Commission and the appropriate
Federal banking regulator as applicable.126 Below is a tabular summary
of how the Agencies defined the QRM in the Proposed Rules followed
by an analysis of key components of the QRM definition.

122. See Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(b)(1)–(3), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,165. The
Proposed Rules also include an appendix, which details standards for determining
acceptable sources for a borrower’s down payment and standards for verifying a
borrower’s income. See id. at 24,173–86. Discussion of the specifics of the appendix is
not included here, as the standards themselves have not been singled out for
controversy.
123. The term “depositor” has three meanings. “Depositor means the person that
receives or purchases and transfers or sells the securitized assets to the issuing entity.”
Credit Risk Retention, §___.2, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,156. “[I]n the case of a securitization
transaction, where there is not an intermediate transfer of the assets from the sponsor to
the issuing entity,” depositor means sponsor. Id. Depositor also means “[t]he person
that receives or purchases and transfers or sells the securitized assets to the issuing
entity in the case of a securitization transaction where the person transferring or selling
the securitized assets directly to the issuing entity is itself a trust.” Id.
124. The Proposed Rules define a “sponsor” as “a person who organizes and
initiates a securitization transaction by selling or transferring assets, either directly or
indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the issuing entity.” Id. §___.2, 76 Fed. Reg.
at 24,157.
125. See id. §___.15(b)(4)(i)–(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,165–66.
126. See id. §___.15(b)(4)(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,165–66.
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Table 2: Proposed QRM
Underwriting Criteria




Credit History




Ability to Repay






Closed-end first-lien mortgage to purchase or
refinance a one-to-four family property at least one
unit of which is a dwelling of a family.
A QRM cannot be a construction loan, reverse
mortgage, bridge loan or timeshare.
Borrower must not be 60 days or more past due on
any debt obligation in past 24 months.
Borrower must not have been a debtor in
bankruptcy within the last three years.
A QRM must fit within the definition of the QM as
defined under Title 14 of Dodd-Frank (which
amends the Truth In Lending Act).
No reverse mortgages or interest only payments.
For adjustable rate mortgages, the interest rate may
not increase by more than 2% in any twelve month
period or by 6% over the life of the transaction.

Loan to Value Ratio



80% in a purchase transaction, 75% in a refinancing
and 70% in cash out refinancing.

Servicing/Default
Mitigation



Provides financial incentives for servicers to
consider options other than foreclosure, such as loan
modifications.

Rules Protecting
Sponsors and
Depositors



The Proposed Rules seek to balance the interest of
encouraging sponsors to review the loans
collateralizing an ABS transaction against the
interest of not detering sponsors from issuing ABS
altogether. Accordingly, a sponsor would not lose
the protection of the QRM safe harbor provision if
they were to follow the internal review procedures
required by the Proposed Rules and take additional
measures to remediate any errors.

1. Underwriting Criteria for QRM
The Proposed Rules limit a QRM to a closed-end first lien
mortgage to purchase or refinance a one-to-four family property, at least
one unit of which is the principal dwelling of a borrower.127 A QRM
127.

Id. §___.15(c)–(d)(1), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.
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may not be a (i) loan to finance the initial construction of a property, (ii)
a reverse mortgage, (iii) a bridge loan with a term of twelve months or
less, or a (iv) time share.128
2. Credit History
To qualify as a QRM, a creditor must verify and document that
within 90 days prior to the closing of the mortgage, the borrower is not
30 days or more past due, in whole or in part, on the mortgage, and is
not 60 or more days past due, in whole or in part, on any debt obligation
within the preceding 24 months.129 Further, within the preceding 36
months, a borrower must not have been a debtor in a bankruptcy
proceeding, had property repossessed or foreclosed upon, engaged in a
short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, or been subject to a federal or
state judgment for collection of any unpaid debt.130 The creditor may
satisfy these underwriting criteria by obtaining at least two credit reports
from consumer reporting agencies that compile and maintain files on
consumers on a nationwide basis, indicating that the borrower meets all
the requisite underwriting criteria.131
3. Payment Terms and Assumability
Consistent with the requirements for a qualified mortgage under
section 1639(b)(2) of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), the Proposed
Rules seek to discourage loan terms that were associated with predatory
lending in the years leading up to the crisis.132 The Proposed Rules
exclude QRMs from having payment terms that allow interest-only
payments or negative amortization.133 In addition, the Proposed Rules
prohibit balloon payments, “defined . . . as a scheduled payment of
principal and interest that is more than twice as large as any earlier
scheduled payment of principal and interest.”134 To protect against the
adverse impact of interest rate shocks, for adjustable rate mortgages to
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. §___.15(c), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.
See id. §___.15(d)(5)(i)(A)–(B), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.
See id. §___.15(d)(5)(i)(C), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.
See id. §___.15(d)(5)(ii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.
See Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26.
See Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(d)(6), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.
76 Fed. Reg. at 24,122; see Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(d)(6)(ii), 76 Fed.
Reg. at 24,166.
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qualify as QRMs, the Agencies propose that the annual interest rate
must not increase by more than (a) 2% in any twelve month period and
by (b) 6% over the life of the mortgage transaction.135 Consistent with
TILA, the Proposed Rules prohibit the QRM from having any points and
fees in excess of 3% and any pre-payment penalty.136 Also, a QRM is
not assumable by any person who was not a borrower under the original
mortgage transaction.137
4. Debt to Income Ratios (DTI)/ Ability to Repay
To be a QRM, the Proposed Rules stipulate that the borrower’s
front-end debt to income ratio (“DTI”) must not exceed 28% and that
the borrower’s back-end DTI must not exceed 36%.138 The creditor
must verify that the DTI ratios are based on the maximum interest rate
that is permitted or required under the mortgage terms during the first
five years of the transaction and a payment schedule that fully amortizes
the mortgage over the term of the mortgage transaction.139 These
proposals are narrower than the requirement of the QM, which imposes
a back-end DTI of 43%.140
5. Loan to Value Ratio
The Proposed Rules require that QRMs meet one of three loan to
value (“LTV”) ratios, defined as the value of the loan to the fair market

135. See id. §___.15(d)(6)(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166. Predatory adjustable rate
mortgages were particularly hurtful to consumers in the years leading up to the financial
crisis. Borrowers took out loans with very low initial (“teaser”) interest rates only to
see the interest rates increase dramatically (a “shock”) after a few years, which led to
defaults. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 11.
136. Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(d)(6)(iv)–(7), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166.
137. Id. §___.15(d)(12), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167.
138. Id. §___.15(d)(8)(i), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166. A front-end DTI ratio refers to the
ratio of a borrower’s monthly housing debt to a borrower’s monthly gross income
whereas a back-end DTI ratio refers to the ratio of a borrower’s total monthly debt to
the borrower’s monthly gross income.
139. See id. §___.15(d)(8)(ii)–(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166–67. Real estate taxes,
hazard insurance, homeowners’ and condominium association dues, ground rent or
leasehold payments and special assessments must be included, pro rata, as applicable, in
computing the requisite DTI ratios. Id. §___.15(d)(8)(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,166–67.
140. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6407, 6587 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. 1026.43(e)(2)(vi)).
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value of the property, depending on the type of mortgage transaction at
issue.141 In a purchase of a one-to-four family property, the LTV ratio at
closing must not exceed 80%.142 In a rate and term refinancing
transaction, the LTV ratio at closing must not exceed 75%.143 Finally, in
a cash out refinancing, the combined LTV ratio at closing must not
exceed 70%.144 The theory behind imposing strict LTV ratios is that,
historically, loans with LTV ratios of 80% or less perform better and
exhibit substantially less default risk than loans with LTV ratios in
excess of 80%.145 As discussed in Part I.C., leading up to the Financial
Crisis, however, loans with LTV ratios of 97%-100% dominated
residential mortgage lending.146 The Proposed Rules require borrowers
to have sufficient equity in their homes before taking out a mortgage or
refinancing an existing mortgage to be QRM eligible.147
6. Down Payment
The down payment component of the QRM is not mentioned in
Section 15G nor is there a requirement of a down payment on the part of
a borrower under the ability to re-pay provisions of Dodd-Frank.
Nevertheless, the Agencies propose a strong down payment requirement
based on data that borrowers are less likely to default if they have more
equity in their homes.148 In the event that the mortgage transaction is for
the purchase of a one to four family property, the Proposed Rules would
require the borrower to provide a cash down payment equal to the sum
of (i) the closing costs payable by the borrower in connection with the
mortgage transaction, (ii) 20% of the lesser of (a) the estimated market
value of the one to four family property as determined by a qualifying
appraisal149 and (b) the purchase price of the one-to-four family
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(d)(9), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167.
Id. §___.15(d)(9)(i), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167.
Id. §___.15(d)(9)(ii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167.
Id. §___.15(d)(9)(iii), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167.
76 Fed. Reg. at 24,123.
See Oesterle, supra note 76, at 750.
See id.
See 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,124 (citing Austin Kelly, Skin in the Game: Zero Down
Payment Mortgage Default, 19 J. HOUSING RESEARCH 75 (2008)), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1330132—.
149. A QRM must be supported by the written appraisal of an independent third
party that conforms to generally accepted appraisal standards. See id. §___.15(d)(11),
76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167.
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property, and (iii) if the estimated market value of the one-to-four family
property as determined by a qualifying appraisal is less than the
purchase price of the property to be paid in connection with the
mortgage transaction, the difference between these amounts.150 By not
allowing the borrower to finance closing costs, and by requiring
borrowers to pay the difference between purchase price of the home and
the market value of the home, the Proposed Rules seek to ensure that the
borrower has sufficient equity in the property to minimize risks of
default.151
7. Rules Protecting Sponsors and Depositors
The Proposed Rules seek to balance the interest of encouraging
sponsors to review the loans collateralizing an ABS transaction against
the interest of not detering sponsors from issuing an ABS altogether.152
The Agencies recognize that “despite the use of robust processes and
procedures, it is possible that one or more loans included in a QRM
securitization transaction may later be determined to have not met the
QRM definition due to inadvertent error.”153 Accordingly, a sponsor
would not lose the protection of the QRM safe harbor provision if they
were to follow the internal review procedures required by the Proposed
Rules and take additional measures to remediate any errors.154
Specifically, a sponsor that has relied on the QRM exemption with
respect to a securitization transaction would not lose the exemption if,
after closing the securitization transaction, it is determined that one or
more of the mortgages collateralizing the ABS do not meet all of the
qualifying criteria, provided that (1) the sponsor/depositor completed the
certification requirements set forth in the regulations, (2) the sponsor
repurchases the loans determined not to be QRMs from the issuing
entity at a price equal to the remaining principal balance and accrued
interest on the loans, and (3) the sponsor notifies all investors of the
ABS of any loans that are required to be repurchased by the sponsor.155

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See id. §___.15(d)(10), 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,167.
Id.
Id.
76 Fed. Reg. at 24,128.
See Credit Risk Retention, §___.15(e), 76 Fed. Reg. 24,167.
Id.
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C. RE-SECURITIZATION PRODUCTS
The Proposed Rules do not allow a securitizer to avoid retaining
risk by creating re-securitizations that re-tranche the credit risk of the
underlying ABS. Two conditions must be met in order for a resecuritization product to be exempt from risk retention.156 First, the resecuritized assets must be collateralized solely by existing ABS that
were structured in compliance with Section 15G.157 Second, the resecuritization may involve the issuance of only a single class of ABS
interests.158 Consequently, a securitizer would be required to retain at
least 5% of the risk of a CDO (a product that re-tranches an ABS), even
if all of the assets that underlie the ABS were QRMs (or in the case of a
non-mortgage transaction, even where all of the underlying assets were
exempt from risk retention).159
D. TREATMENT OF GSES AND GOVERNMENT-RELATED EXEMPTIONS
The Proposed Rules exempt loans owned, insured or guaranteed by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from risk retention while under the
conservatorship of the FHFA.160 To the Agencies, the GSEs’ guarantee
of timely payment coupled with capital support from the Federal
Government satisfies the risk retention requirements.161 The rules with
respect to the Premium Capture Account and the prohibitions on
hedging also do not apply to the GSEs while under the conservatorship
of the FHFA. The Proposed Rules also exempt any security backed by
the Federal Government or any state government from risk retention.

156.
157.
158.

See 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,138.
See 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,138–39.
Id. The Agencies describe the types of re-securitized bonds that would meet
this exemption, see 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,138–39, but further discussion of resecuritization products is beyond the scope of this paper. The important takeaway is
that this particular proposed rule would prohibit the most common and dangerous forms
of re-securitization transactions (e.g., the CDO), see supra notes 1–9, 41–57 and
accompanying text, from being exempt from risk retention.
159. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,138; see also Credit Risk Retention, §___.21(a)(5), 76
Fed. Reg. at 24,172–73.
160. 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,112.
161. Id. The Proposed Rules with respect to the Premium Capture Account,
§___.12, as well as prohibitions on hedging, §___.14(b), (c) and (d), do not apply to the
GSEs while in conservatorship.
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III. MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED RISK RETENTION RULES
Part III of this Comment provides a market analysis of the
Proposed Rules. The accomplishments of the Proposed Rules in
attacking the flaws in the pre-crisis securitization market are discussed
followed by a survey of the major concerns that the proposed risk
retention framework raises, including concerns raised by consumer
advocates, mortgage originators, financiers, lawmakers and academics.
A. THE MERITS OF THE PROPOSED RISK RETENTION RULES: HOW THEY
ADDRESS KEY PROBLEMS IN THE PRE-CRISIS MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION
PROCESS
As they apply to residential mortgages, the Proposed Risk
Retention Rules target the incentive misalignment that plagued
mortgage securitization in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis by
closely aligning the economic interests of securitizers and investors. In
doing so, the Agencies define the QRM exemption narrowly, inhibit
securitizers from profiting off of arranging an RMBS unless the RMBS
pays off all investors in full,162 and prohibit the type of detrimental
hedging activities witnessed in the years leading up to the Financial
Crisis.163 These proposals, working in conjunction with other provisions
of Dodd-Frank, address two goals of paramount importance: 1) deterring
predatory securitization and excessive liquidity creation that contributed
to the Financial Crisis and 2) keeping private label mortgage
securitization flexible enough to allow capital to flow to borrowers who
pose low default risks but would not meet the QRM exemption.164
1. Deterring Predatory Securitization and Excessive Liquidity Creation
The narrow definition of the QRM is intended to change private
label mortgage securitization markets so that most RMBS transactions
require risk retention on the part of the securitizer. The Agencies
defined the QRM exemption narrowly, because, in the words of Sheila
Bair, “the QRM is the exception not the rule.”165 Moreover, the
prohibitions on hedging and the establishment of the Premium Capture
Account ensure that incentives are aligned in the securitization chain.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A.2.
See Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26.
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By inhibiting sponsors from hedging against their required exposure to
an ABS, the Proposed Rules prohibit securitizers from taking positions
directly adverse to investors (i.e., by purchasing CDS) in the ABS they
arrange.166 The Premium Capture Account deters imprudent conduct on
the part of securitizers by ensuring that securitizers may only profit off
of a securitization transaction if investors are first paid off in full.167
These measures ensure that securitizers have an incentive to arrange
only those securitizations that are safe and have a high potential for
success.
Had the Citigroup CDO discussed at the beginning of this
Comment been arranged in a securitization structure governed by the
Proposed Rules, the results would have been far different. Citigroup
would have had to retain at least $25 million in the $500 million
transaction, would not have been able to enter into CDSs against the
CDO, and the $160 million in fees it collected for arranging the CDO
would have been held in the Premium Capture Account to serve as a
first loss position for the benefit of investors.168 Given the financial
incentives, it is highly unlikely that Citigroup would arrange this deal if
it were doomed to failure, as it would suffer a $25 million loss and
would not collect any fees. Prior to the crisis, financial incentives led to
originators and securitizers fraudulently passing off subprime mortgages
as investment grade to investors because they had the ability to profit off
of an ABS or CDO simply by arranging it, or, worse still, by betting
against it.169 Under the new framework, a securitizer’s ultimate fate is
inextricably tied to that of the investors, which, in turn, should give
them an incentive to pay close attention to the behavior and practices of
mortgage originators.170 Forcing securitizers to monitor the loan quality
of the assets they securitize should deter excessive mortgage origination
on loan terms that borrowers simply cannot afford, as these deals would
threaten a securitizer’s ability to collect fees.171

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92, 110–21 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26 (arguing that skin-in-the-game rules will
assure that originators and securitizers cannot escape the consequences of their own
lending practices).
171. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
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2. Merits of the Narrowness of the QRM Definition
Other than incentivizing a structure in which most securitization
transactions involve risk retention on the part of securitizers, a narrow
QRM also provides the private label mortgage securitization market
with some needed flexibility. According to Bair, the QRM should
become the exception in the mortgage market, while the non-QRM risk
retention loan should become the dominant form of mortgage
securitization.172 It is also hoped that a narrow QRM excludes enough
high quality home loans such that ABS backed by high quality nonQRMs “may be routinely issued and purchased by a wide variety of
investors.”173 The rule makers explain that their study of mortgage
lending strongly suggests that the loans that meet the minimum QRM
standards carry low default risk even during adverse economic
conditions, such as a period of high unemployment coupled with sharply
declining home prices.174 They note that certain safe mortgage loans
will be left out of the QRM definition, thereby making the market for
such securities relatively liquid.175 By contrast, the broader the
definition of QRM, the more convoluted the exemption becomes, and
the less liquid the market ordinarily would be for residential mortgages
falling outside of the QRM definition.176
B. CONCERNS OVER THE PROPOSED RISK RETENTION REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
The Proposed Rules have ironically united mortgage originators,
financiers, lawmakers and consumer advocates alike in fierce opposition
to the QRM.177 The arguments generally assume that the additional

172.
173.
174.
175.

Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26.
Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,118 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011).
Id. at 24,117–18.
Id. at 24,118. The Agencies explain that “incorporating all of the tradeoffs that
may prudently be made as part of a secured underwriting process into a regulation
would be very difficult without introducing a level of complexity and cost that could
undermine any incentives for sponsors to securitize, and originators to originate,
QRMs.” Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 27; Josh Silver & Archana Pradhan, Nat’l Cmty.
Reinvestment Coal., The Impact of the Proposed Qualified Residential Mortgage
Definition on Home Opportunity in America (2011), available at
http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/73355463?access_key=key-13t4p3yx457mnaevylg0;
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costs of skin-in-the-game in non-QRM loans will ultimately be passed
on to consumers.178 As a result, most commentators suspect that the
QRM loan will be the most common loan on the market whereas the
non-QRM will be a costly alternative.179 Consequently, commentators
propose that the definition of the QRM be expanded.
Economists speculate180 that securitizers will require a higher return
on the 5% stake they hold than investors usually require, which, in turn,
will necessitate higher interest rates on non-QRM loans.181 It is argued
that securitizers will require additional returns primarily due to capital
constraints.182 Commentators fear that risk retention coupled with
additional capital constraints will dis-incentivize non-QRM lending, and
potentially make non-QRM loans prohibitively expensive, or even put
private label mortgage lending out of business altogether.183 Whereas
regulators forecast that the costs of skin-in-the-game will increase the
Am. Securitization Forum, ASF Risk Retention Letter to Joint Regulators: Executive
Summary (2011), available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/
ASF_Risk_Retention_Comment_Letter_Executive_Summary.pdf; Nat’l Ass’n of
Realtors, Letter Regarding Credit Risk Retention Proposed Rule (2011), available at
http://www.ksefocus.com/billdatabase/clientfiles/172/3/1292.pdf; Jon Prior, More
Lawmakers Join Major Push to Reduce QRM Down Payment, HOUSINGWIRE (June
20, 2011, 3:56 pm), http://www.housingwire.com/2011/06/20/more-lawmakers-joinmajor-push-to-reduce-qrm-down-payment; Davis Polk, Proposed Credit Risk Retention
Rules Raise Serious Concerns (2011), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/
Publication/fb3d913d-f3b6-45c9-9657-003251fd80cb/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/3e99bb31-2cac-4063a6370b9a4cfa61f3/060111ProposedCreditRisk.pdf.
178. See, e.g., ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 29, at 5.
179. See, e.g., id.
180. It is important to note that any projection on how private label mortgage
interest rates will be affected by skin-in-the-game is speculative at best. There is simply
not enough hard data to predict, with confidence, how the market will react. See
GEITHNER, supra note 10, at 6 (suggesting that studies on the implications of risk
retention are limited).
181. See ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 29, at 5. Reasoning by analogy, Zandi and
DeRitis argue that securitizers will require a significantly higher return than that of
investors because mortgage insurers currently require a 15% return for keeping some
skin-in-the-game. The economists argue that if the required return for securitizers was
6% higher than that of investors, interest rates would increase by 30 basis points, and if
securitizers’ required return was 9% higher than that of investors, interest rates would
increase by 45 basis points. Id.
182. See, e.g., id.
183. See, e.g., id.; see also Davis Polk, supra note 177, at 4 (suggesting that the
premium capture reserve account would have a “significant and negative impact” on the
volume of private label securitizations).

2013]

DEFENDING SKIN-IN-THE-GAME

439

interest rates on non-QRM loans by 10 to 15 basis points, commentators
forecast that interest rates could increase by as much as 100184 to 185185
basis points.
The potential for skin-in-the-game to make home loans more
expensive creates a concern that homeownership will become very
difficult to attain.186 Consistent with regulatory intent that seeks to make
the QRM the exception to the mortgage market, commentators point out
that most home loans originated in the last decade were not QRMs.187
Commentators fear that this phenomenon is particularly concerning for
Because historical data suggests that
low-income borrowers.188
minorities and low-income individuals are especially unlikely to qualify
for QRM loans today, commentators fear that the Proposed Rules will
ultimately make home ownership even more difficult for these groups to
attain.189
On the structuring side, the American Securitization Forum
(“ASF”) is concerned that the Premium Capture Account is “lethal” to
the securitization market.190 According to the ASF, the Premium

184.
185.

ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 29, at 3, 6.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, supra note 177, at 19. Of course, doomsday
projections from mortgage brokers must be taken with a grain of salt.
186. See, e.g., id.
187. See ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 26, at 2–3 (arguing that only one-fifth of
mortgage originations between 1997 and 2009 were QRMs and only one-third of
originations made in 2009 alone, the year lending standards were tightest, would have
met the Proposed Rules definition of a QRM).
188. See, e.g., Silver & Pradhan, supra note 174, at 2.
189. The down payment requirement in the Proposed Rules has been singled out for
criticism because of its potential disparate effect on low-income groups and minorities.
See, e.g., Silver & Pradhan, supra note 177, at 2 (arguing that a down payment of 20%
reduces QRM ineligibility for many while only marginally having an impact on default
rates). Senators sent letters to the Agencies on May 26, 2011, contending that the
Proposed Rules go beyond the intent of Dodd-Frank in implementing stringent down
payment requirements. See Comment Letter on QRM from 39 Members of the U.S.
Senate to the Agencies (May 26, 2011), available at http://www.hagan.senate.gov/files/
images/SenateQRMLetter.pdf. The National Association of Realtors makes especially
troubling predictions about the ability of middle to low-income families, and certain
minorities in particular, to obtain QRM loans. See Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, supra note
177, at 15. Similarly, a big law partner suggests that the QRM means the death of the
American Dream. See Richard J. Andreano, Jr., Death of the American Dreams Focus
on QRM, 128 BANKING L.J. 714 (2011).
190. The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Customers, Credit, and Job Creators: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm.
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Capture Account adds an additional skin-in-the-game requirement on
securitizers on top of the 5% requirement that may disincentivize
sponsors from structuring securitizations altogether, thereby making
homeownership more costly for non-prime borrowers in particular.191
This concern is well founded. For instance, in a securitization pool
where all the mortgages have thirty year terms, the current structure
would inhibit a securitizer from collecting fees for three decades until it
is certain that investors in an ABS are paid in full.192 Although this
structure would force a securitizer to have its skin-in-the-game for the
long-haul, it appears to be impracticable, only leaving an incentive to
structure a securitization for financing purposes.193 Moreover, this fee
structure would make it very difficult for the private sector to displace
the government’s involvement in the mortgage market while the GSEs
remain exempt from the risk retention rules while under the
conservatorship of the FHFA.194
ASF also advocates for a QRM blend exception, which would
allow a securitizer to mix non-QRM and QRM loans in an ABS and
retain 5% of the risk of the non-QRM loans in the ABS only; a safeharbor for loans that are securitized well after origination (about one to
three years); and a sunset safe harbor provision that allows a securitizer
on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Tom Deutsch, Executive Director,
American Securitization Forum, at 3), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ba16-wstate-tdeutsch-20120710.pdf (“Some rules like the
premium capture cash reserve account are so lethal to the RMBS and CMBS markets
that those markets are predicted to become relegated to history books for all of those
other than a few niche players serving extremely limited segments of the market, if that
rule were to be put into place as proposed.”).
191. Understanding the Implications and Consequences of the Proposed Rule on
Risk Retention: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored
Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 15 (2011) (statement of Tom
Deutsch, Executive Director, American Securitization Forum), available at
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_HFSC_Risk_Retention_Te
stimony_4-14-11.pdf.
192. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
193. The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Customers, Credit, and Job Creators, supra note
190, at 8 (statement of Tom Deutsch); but see ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 29, at 4
(acknowledging that securitizers’ ability to cover costs upfront under the Proposed
Rules is in doubt but predicting that regulators will clarify that securitizers will be able
to retain a standardized fee—that is not required to be held in the premium capture cash
reserve account—for arranging an ABS).
194. The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Customers, Credit, and Job Creators, supra note
190, at 9.
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to shed its skin-in-the-game if the loans have performed for a reasonable
period of time.195 ASF also requests that the prohibitions on hedging
only apply for a specified number of years after the securitization closes
so that sponsors are allowed to hedge against their exposures if market
conditions change.196
In contrast to the critiques above, which find the rulemaking too
onerous on securitizers and borrowers, some scholars’ criticism cuts in
the other direction.197 These academics are concerned that skin-in-thegame does not inform investors of the credit risk of mortgage
securitization products and cannot prevent risky lending from
threatening the solvency of the financial system in real-time.198 These
scholars would prohibit securitizing mortgage loans altogether if the
mortgages to be securitized do not conform to certain “plain”
standardized criteria with low default risk. 199 These scholars note that
Section 941 leaves the door open to such standardization by allowing
the Agencies to propose risk retention rules onerous enough to deter
securitization or origination of non-QRM loans altogether.200
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: WHAT THE FINAL RULES SHOULD
LOOK LIKE FOR THE RMBS MARKET
Although private label securities account for only 5% of the
secondary mortgage market,201 there is strong reason to believe that the
risk retention rules will have a significant impact on the mortgage
195.
196.

See, e.g., American Securitization Forum, supra note 177, at 4.
See Understanding the Implications and Consequences of the Proposed Rule
on Risk Retention, supra note 191, at 197 (statement of Tom Deutsch).
197. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 30, at 1256–58 (arguing that niche
mortgage loans should not be securitized at all but should remain entirely on bank
balance sheets); see also Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing
Finance: Can it Restore Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J.
ON REG. 155 (2012).
198. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance, supra note 197, at
164.
199. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 30, at 1256–57.
200. Id. at 1256 n.279.
201. Jon Prior, Pending Conforming Loan Limit Decrease Puts California on Edge,
HOUSINGWIRE (June 23, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/pendingconforming-loan-limit-decrease-puts-california-edge. As previously mentioned, RMBS
products arranged by the GSEs are exempt from risk retention, restrictions on hedging
and premium capture while under the conservatorship of the FHFA. See supra Part
II.D.
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market in the near future. A congressional study on the future of the
GSEs reveals that the ability of the GSEs to exit conservatorship will
require a return to financial viability, which would require the
generation of interest among private investors to hold an equity stake in
the GSEs. 202 Whether such investor interest is sufficient to allow the
GSEs to stand on their own would in turn depend upon the equity
investment appetite for an entity that issues RMBS products.203
Consequently, the creation of a safe, well-functioning and profitable
private label mortgage securitization market under the framework of the
final risk retention rules that is able to establish investor confidence in
entities that issue RMBS products, may be crucial in determining
whether the GSEs will exit conservatorship without further government
assistance.204
Further, it is worth noting that there has been recent activity in the
private label mortgage market that suggests that there is still interest in
generating private label RMBS products despite the announcement of
the supposedly “onerous” Proposed Rules.205 Shell Point Financial filed
a shelf registration to issue RMBS securities products,206 Redwood
Trust207 (another private company) recently completed its fifth RMBS
transaction of the year, and Residential Capital’s mortgage servicing and
origination units were sold in a bankruptcy auction to Ocwen Captial
and Walter Investment Management Corp. for $3 billion.208 Whether
such deals will become increasingly commonplace or be considered an
aberration will also depend on the structure and substance of the final
risk retention rules.209

202. N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34661, FANNIE MAE’S AND
FREDDIE MAC’S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS 15 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/RL34661.pdf.
203. Id. at 15.
204. Id.
205. See supra notes 177–94 and accompanying text.
206. Jacob Gaffney, Shellpoint Files to Issue Private Mortgage Bonds,
HOUSINGWIRE (Oct. 15, 2012, 3:47 PM), available at http://www.housingwire.com/
news/shellpoint-files-issue-private-mortgage-bonds.
207. Id.
208. Press Release, Ocwen Fin. Corp., Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and Walter
Investment Management Corp. Awarded Winning Bid for ResCap’s Mortgage
Servicing and Origination Platform (Oct. 24, 2012), available at
http://shareholders.ocwen.com/releases.cfm.
209. Accord Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26.
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This section advocates for final rules that maintain the narrow
QRM exemption, require risk to be retained until maturity, and keep the
prohibition on hedging and the establishment of a Premium Capture
Account in place; however, this section argues that a securitizer should
be allowed to collect profits from the Premium Capture Account, at the
discretion of a trustee, after three to five years, if an RMBS has
performed well, to ensure a financial incentive still remains for
securitizers to arrange RMBS transactions. This Comment is written in
hopes that these recommendations would best create a safe mortgage
securitization market that generates investor confidence in both private
label RMBS products and equity investor interest in entities that issue
such products, such that credit may flow to borrowers who are actually
able to afford homes and that the GSEs have a viable option of leaving
conservatorship without further government assistance.
A. DEFENDING A NARROW QRM EXEMPTION
The final risk retention rules should maintain the definition of the
QRM outlined in the Proposed Rules, including the controversial down
payment requirement. Both rule makers and critics admit that borrowers
who pose a low default risk will be denied QRM loans under the
Proposed Rules.210 While some critics see this as an outright bar to
homeownership for certain groups, it is at least equally plausible that the
market will realize that there are non-QRM loans of investment quality,
thereby allowing borrowers to take out affordable non-QRM loans at
reasonable rates.211 The economic literature demonstrates that in the
years prior to the Financial Crisis, demand for investment-grade quality
home loans is what increased credit availability to borrowers.212 The
new risk retention structure in which the QRM is narrowly defined
210. Joe Adler, FDIC’s Bair Would Rather Eliminate QRM from Risk Retention
Rule, BANK INVESTMENT CONSULTANT (June 10, 2011), available at
http://www.bankinvestmentconsultant.com/news/FDIC-banks-risk-management-QRM2673729-1.html. In acknowledgement of the broad pushback against the QRM, Sheila
Bair retorted, “If we could just get rid of [QRM] it would be fine with me, just making
sure that the [risk retention] is 5% [for all mortgage loans].” Id. Bair maintains that the
premium on non-QRM loans should only be 10 to 15 basis points and that the nonQRM loan will be the most common loan on the private label market. Id. Of course,
getting rid of the QRM would require amending Dodd-Frank, which would open up a
can of worms that could cause more harm than good. Rule makers should work within
the framework given by the legislation.
211. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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should encourage the origination and securitization of prudently
underwritten home loans that will inspire investor confidence in such
products and in the entities that issue them.213
Of course, a narrow QRM (and new regulations thereunder) will
inevitably reign in the free flow of capital seen during the pre-crisis
days—this seems right given that the pre-Financial Crisis market was
artificially created.214 This token critique of the risk retention rules, that
it scalps capital market liquidity, may prove beneficial if it prevents
excess leveraging on a consumer and corporate level. Left unregulated,
securitization encouraged over-borrowing, both from consumers who
sought home loans and financial institutions that borrowed against
mortgage securities products.215 Before pointing out that skin-in-thegame will decrease liquidity, it is helpful to be mindful that the inflated
rate of household borrowing seen prior to the Financial Crisis in the
United States was unsustainable.216 Further, at some point, the federal
funds rate will have to increase, and worse still, the eagerness of net
lenders to finance American borrowing will cool.217 Some economists
have forecasted the shift from net-debtor country to net-creditor country
as potentially catastrophic given our current household borrowing
level.218 I am not suggesting that skin-in-the-game is a potential solution
to the balance of payments problems, but a cursory mention of these
issues highlights that excessive liquidity and leveraging are
unsustainable in the long run. Addressing over-borrowing is a concern
that should be at least pari-passu with the expansion of homeownership.
If a narrow QRM that includes a down payment requirement means that
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26.
See e.g., Oesterle, supra note 76, at 759–60.
See supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., CHARLES ROXBURGH ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, DEBT
AND DELEVERAGING: UNEVEN PROGRESS ON THE PATH TO GROWTH 2–4 (Jan. 2012),
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/financial_markets/
uneven_progress_on_the_path_to_growth (arguing that sustainable household
borrowing must be measured at rates observed prior to the housing bubble and that the
U.S. economy is only half-way towards deleveraging to a natural rate); accord Stijn
Claessens, Shedding Debt, FIN. & DEV., June 2012, at 23, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/06/pdf/claessens.pdf.
217. See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, The US as a Net Debtor: The
Sustainability of the US External Imbalances 6–7 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/nroubini/papers/Roubini-Setser-US-ExternalImbalances.pdf.
218. See id at 6–7.
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individuals have to save more to attain homeownership, this result may
prove more socially desirable than recklessly expanding homeownership
by having individuals borrow at unsustainable rates.219 In contrast,
omission of the down payment restriction would result in a truly absurd
result: Dodd-Frank regulations would not impose on lenders an
obligation to require consumers to retain any equity in their homes to
avail themselves of safe-harbor provisions under Title 14 and Section
941 of the Act.220
Should it become apparent that homeownership has become a
significant impediment to disadvantaged groups due to the QRM, then
regulators should craft specific rules to target such distressed
neighborhoods221 under their authority to establish exemptions in the
public interest ex post.222 Moreover, these exemptions should be crafted
narrowly. As we saw in the 1990s, government housing initiatives that
were targeted at underprivileged communities led to lax lending
standards that were effectively given to everyone, including real estate
speculators, second home buyers, and wealthy homeowners.223 It would
not be desirable policy to subsidize those markets in the name of
ameliorating the disparate effects of income inequality.224 In addition to
making the market for non-QRM loans less liquid, expanding the QRM
exemption may re-open the door to shady lending practices seen in the
pre-Financial Crisis securitization market, as more loans would then be
structured in a market where risk retention is not required.225
B. MODIFYING THE PREMIUM CAPTURE ACCOUNT; MAINTAINING
DURATION OF RISK RETENTION AND RESTRICTIONS ON HEDGING
It is important to keep the interests of securitizers and those of
investors closely aligned to deter the creation of products that profit
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra notes 78–87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
See Oesterle, supra note 76, at 759–60.
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-11(c)(1)(G)(i), (iii) (West 2012) (giving rule makers the
authority to exempt securities from risk retention, particularly those backed by state
governments, if in the public interest and for the protection of investors). Or perhaps
state governments could remediate disparate effects of income inequality themselves by
guaranteeing a subset of home loans to targeted communities. See id. (exempting ABS
backed by any state of the United States or by the United States from risk retention).
223. See supra Part I.C.
224. See Oesterle, supra note 76, at 760.
225. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text; accord Press Release, FDIC,
supra note 26.
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securitizers but harm investors, borrowers and the economy at large.226
At the same time, a balance must be struck between this interest and the
interest of preserving a financial incentive for financial institutions to
participate in structured finance altogether so that credit may flow to
worthy borrowers.227 The Premium Capture Account established by the
Proposed Rules is thus needed but requires modification.
The reserve account is needed so that profits collected from
arranging a securitization transaction do not offset the required risk
retention that a securitizer retains.228 For instance, in a $1 billion
transaction, if a securitizer collects $75 million in fees and retains 5% or
$50 million of the ABS, regardless of what ultimately becomes of the
ABS, the securitizer will receive a net profit of at least $25 million. The
Premium Capture Account in the Proposes Rules would require such
amount to be held in trust to serve as a first loss position for the benefit
of investors until the ABS pays investors off in full.229
This proposal, however, is too onerous in that amounts from the
Premium Capture Account cannot be realized by a securitizer for many
years (potentially ten to thirty years depending on the duration of the
underlying mortgage loans), which, practically speaking, would
eliminate the incentive to arrange a securitization except for financing
purposes.230 Financiers are driven by realizing short-term profits and
such a rule does not put the private sector on fair footing to compete
with Fannie and Freddie securitizations while under the FHFA.231
As a result, the final risk retention rules should modify the
Premium Capture Account such that it holds a securitizer’s profits in
trust to serve as a first loss position in an ABS for the first three to five
years after the RMBS transaction closes.232 After this point, the trustee

226.
227.
228.

See, e.g., supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 187–94 and accompanying text.
See Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,096, 24,113–14 (proposed
Apr. 29, 2011).
229. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
232. Empirical research suggests that default rates decline substantially once a
mortgage performs for three years. See, e.g., SHANE M. SHERLUND, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MORTGAGE DEFAULTS 5–6 (2010), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/region/foreclosure_resource_center/mo
re_mortgage_defaults.pdf. Default rates flatten further after three years from
origination. Id.
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of the account should be allowed to release all or a portion of the funds
back to a securitizer at her discretion if the ABS has generally made
timely payments to investors. For fairness, the trustee could have
fiduciary obligations to both investors in the ABS and the securitizer,
and would only inhibit profit collection for a securitizer if there is a
substantial risk that the ABS is not as valuable as marketed to investors
at closing. This rule would deter a securitizer from arranging a
transaction that is destined for failure while at the same time allow a
securitizer to realize a profit from arranging a healthy ABS within a
reasonable time-frame, thereby preserving a realistic financial incentive
for private entities to participate in structured finance.233
The duration of a securitizer’s required 5% risk retention, however,
should continue until the ABS reaches maturity and should take the
form of horizontal retention of the most subordinated tranche in an ABS.
This way, a securitizer has an economic interest that is aligned with that
of investors over the duration of the ABS and absorbs the riskiest
position in an ABS, thereby maintaining a securitizers incentive to
scrutinize loan-underwriting standards closely.234 In turn, this retention
should give investors confidence that they are not being duped into
purchasing RMBS products that fail in later years and should hopefully
generate enough investor demand in RMBS products to keep mortgage
rates from becoming prohibitively costly.235 The prohibitions on
hedging (except for the limited purpose for hedging against interest rate
and foreign exchange risk) in the Proposed Rules236 should remain intact
in the final rulemaking to ensure that the interests of securitizers are
never adverse to those of investors and that the incentive to monitor loan
quality is not offset, as seen in the years leading up to the Financial
Crisis.237
CONCLUSION
The failures of the originate-to-distribute model of securitization
demonstrated how powerful financial incentives can be in influencing
233.
234.

Cf. supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
See Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26; see also supra notes 110–11 and
accompanying text; Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,102 (proposed Apr.
29, 2011).
235. Mortgage credit is supply driven as seen in the years leading up to the financial
crisis. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
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the activities of intermediaries in the mortgage securitization process.238
Financial incentives led to knowingly shady activity on the part of
originators, securitizers and credit ratings agencies all for the purpose of
generating profits.239 Thus, forcing securitizers to maintain a financial
interest in the products they distribute is likely crucial to correcting the
flaws in private label mortgage lending that caused the Financial
Crisis.240
The Agencies undertook a daunting task in proposing risk retention
rules in a previously unregulated area of structured finance.241
Commentators are right to point out that homeownership will be more
difficult to attain as a result of the Proposed Rules, but they fail to
explain why increasing homeownership is a national goal that takes
precedence over all others, including curtailing the excessive leveraging
and unsustainable borrowing that led to the Financial Crisis.242 The
Proposed Risk Retention Rules deserve praise for crafting a narrow safe
harbor and prohibiting a securitizer from profiting off of arranging a
securitization pool if it ultimately fails.243 These proposals ensure that
most RMBS products would be arranged in a system where risk
retention is required, thereby giving securitizers a financial incentive to
monitor underwriting quality. This is crucial to making mortgage
securitization safe in a world filled with investors with a penchant for
irrational exuberance; where localized booms and busts have broad
macroeconomic consequences.244 These accomplishments should not be
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.
See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
See Press Release, FDIC, supra note 26.
See supra Parts I.A.–I.C.
This is not to say that the risk retention rules are the panacea for fixing the
causes of the financial crisis. The risk retention provisions compliment other parts of
the Dodd-Frank Act, which are intended to make securitization and mortgage lending
safer and more transparent. This includes restricting mortgage loan origination unless a
lender has verified a borrower’s ability to repay, regulating credit ratings agencies,
requiring more review and disclosures with respect to the assets underlying ABS pools;
vesting the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with the power to regulate mortgage
lending; regulation of dangerous financial interconnectedness and the creation of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council—the ultimate stopper in the regulatory overhaul.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §§ 163, 610, 932, 935, 936, 943, 945, 124 Stat. 1376, 1422, 1611, 1872, 1884–85,
1897, 1898 (2010).
244. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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lost when regulators sit down and craft the final rules. At the same time,
it is paramount that regulators ease the consequences of the Premium
Capture Account such that a securitizer may realize some profit off of
arranging a healthy ABS transaction a few years after a transaction
closes, thereby keeping private label interest in arranging ABS
transactions alive.245 Regulators should proceed with caution in easing
other requirements in the Proposed Rules, however, as their primary
goals should be to make securitization safe by deterring excessive
leveraging and liquidity creation that could cause widespread economic
harm. This in turn should hopefully create a healthy private label
mortgage securitization market that generates enough investment
demand for RMBS products and equity stakes in the entities that issue
them to allow for the flow of sustainable credit to the housing market.

245.

See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text.

